













































University of Adelaide 






A Model of State Infrastructure with Decentralized 
Public Agents: 













 CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
The Centre was established in 1989 by the Economics Department of the 
Adelaide University to strengthen teaching and research in the field of 
international economics and closely related disciplines. Its specific objectives 
are: 
 
•  to promote individual and group research by scholars within and outside 
the Adelaide University 
•  to strengthen undergraduate and post-graduate education in this field 
•  to provide shorter training programs in Australia and elsewhere 
•  to conduct seminars, workshops and conferences for academics and for 
the wider community 
•  to publish and promote research results 
•  to provide specialised consulting services 
•  to improve public understanding of international economic issues, 
especially among policy makers and shapers 
 
Both theoretical and empirical, policy-oriented studies are emphasised, with a 
particular focus on developments within, or of relevance to, the Asia-Pacific 










School of Economics 
Adelaide University  
SA 5005 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone: (+61 8) 8303 5672 
Facsimile: (+61 8) 8223 1460 
Email: cies@adelaide.edu.au 
 
Most publications can be downloaded from our Home page: 
http://www.adelaide.edu.au/cies/ 
 
ISSN 1444-4534 series, electronic publication  





A Model of State Infrastructure with 
Decentralized Public Agents: 









School of Economics 
University of Adelaide 
AUSTRALIA 5005 
 
Phone: (+61 8) 8303 5757  














The author is grateful to Patricia Sourdin for research assistance, the University of 
Adelaide, School of Economics for invaluable discussion, and The Australian 
Research Council for financial support. 
 Abstract 
 
The imperative of the state, irrespective of its organization, is to provide law 
and order, contract enforcement, and property rights. The government provides the 
foundation for markets to function and for society to prosper. A common thread in 
any government is that, for a given society, the state holds a monopoly over most of 
its services. Although the state may choose not to exploit this market power, the 
public agents that represent the state within the aggregate production process, 
necessarily will. 
The following paper presents a macroeconomic framework that explicitly 
considers the local monopoly power of public agents. In the context of a 
representative agent model, I consider a private sector production function versus a 
public sector production function in which both sectors compete over labor and 
capital. Estimates are made of the productivity of private versus public capital, of 
private versus public labor, and of public infrastructure within the private sector 
production function. The theoretical implications of decentralized public agents are 
then analyzed within an endogenous growth framework. 
The results suggest that the elasticity of public infrastructure is significantly 
lower than previous estimates. They also confirm that the elasticity of private 
infrastructure is country specific. The theoretical results suggest that decentralization 
of public agents which, intuitively is greater in less developed countries than 
industrialized ones, is associated with steeper growth paths that lead to lower steady 
state capital labor ratios and per capita consumption levels. This implies that shocks 
to less developed countries have more dramatic effects but shorter life spans than 
shocks to industrialized countries, or more simply, business cycles in developing 
countries are shorter but more volatile. 
 
“You can make of human beings what you want. The way he is governed commends 
Man to good, or to evil.” - J.F. von Pfeiffer (1715-1787) 
 
“Sure there are dishonest men in local government. But there are dishonest men in 
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The imperative of the state, irrespective of its organization, is to provide law and 
order, contract enforcement, and property rights. All of the goods and services 
provided by government, from alleviation of market failures to the enforcement of 
standards, fall into these three broads categories. The government provides the 
foundation for markets to function and for society to prosper. As long as man has 
lived in community, he has had government. Irrespective of type, whether monarchy, 
dictatorship, communism, or democracy, the role of the state, at its most fundamental 
level, is essentially the same. 
A common thread in any government is that, for a given society, the state 
holds a monopoly over its services. The fact that there is no competition in the 
provision of most state services breeds its own type of inefficiency that in most 
societies is typically accepted, if not actually expected, by the private sector. The 
market cannot function, the economy cannot grow, and chaos ultimately ensues 
without some sort of state to monopolize the provision of law and order, contract 
enforcement, and property rights. The following paper considers the implications of 
the state’s monopoly over its services. 
Although the government is generally the sole provider of its services, it does 
not behave like a traditional monopolist. Typically, a monopolistic firm sets price and 
quantity as a single profit maximizing entity with centralized control. This is because, 
in theory, the centrally coordinated firm can impose its will along the entire 
production process. Furthermore, the monopolistic good is clearly defined. The 
government on the other hand is quite different. The goods and services provided by 
the public sector are various and not always clearly defined. Furthermore, the ability 
of the government to centrally coordinate its services breaks down as one moves from   6
mandate to actual provision. How the law is written above is often far different from 
how the law is enforced below. 
The central theme in this paper is that the government actually provides its 
services through a network of decentralized agents. Government employees, i.e. 
public agents, each have a degree of power over some aspect of what the state 
provides. Furthermore, public agents, like private ones, maximize their individual 
welfares subject to constraints. These might include the value of the goods or services 
being rendered, the marginal cost to the dispensing agent, and or the probability and 
cost of detection of dubious activities. As a result, the provision of public services, at 
the most basic level, is carried out by individuals who find themselves in positions of 
power and, bowing to incentives, consequently maximize their respective welfare 
functions. 
An important distinction is between publicly produced goods and pure public 
goods. I assume that pure public goods, those goods subject to market failure caused 
by non-rivalry and or non-exclusivity, are a subset of publicly produced goods. Non-
rival and non-exclusive goods production falls into the state’s categorical role of 
property rights delimitation. In fact, many publicly produced services such as law and 
order as well as contract enforcement, are to a large degree quite rival and exclusive. 
Even infrastructure, such as transportation and communication, is not really a pure 
public goods due to being subject to user fees. Therefore, the Samuelson (1954) 
condition over optimal provision of pure public goods is limited to a subset and does 
not adequately describe the state’s broader control over law and order, property rights, 
and contract enforcement. 
There are numerous examples within society of public services that are 
provided by welfare maximizing decentralized agents as described above. One may   7
enter the department of motor vehicles to find ten workers each behind their 
respective windows yet only one window is actually open. Or consider the police 
officer who exercises his prerogative to stop speeders whenever he is so inclined. And 
when he does actually stop the speeder, he may or may not issue a ticket depending 
upon his mood, his predispositions, and or the speeder’s attributes. In other words, 
that police officer actually dispenses law and order as he sees fit, not necessarily as the 
legal code prescribes. Lastly, consider the judiciary system in any economy. A judge is 
supposed to be impartial but they not always are. Furthermore, the degree of 
sophistication required to invoke the judiciary system coupled with a high opportunity 
cost to individual firms and or individuals can limit access to elites. In most cases, 
public services are dispensed by agents, each of whom is paid a competitive wage. Yet 
they may also realize the significant added benefits to public employment. These 
benefits, I argue, stem from the market power of the state that is ultimately exercised 
by its agents. 
There is a rich literature on decentralization of governance, most often referred 
to as “fiscal federalism.” In general, the concern is the manner in which public goods
1 
are disseminated across society and the efficiency aspects of authority in the hands of 
local government versus central government. Most authors analyze fiscal federalism 
as an alternative mechanism to provide efficient provision of public goods and the 
preservation of market incentives.
2 A review of the issues with particular regard to 
developing countries appears in Bardham (2002). 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, I use a rather loose definition of public goods. By public goods, I really mean 
publicly provided goods, services, and infrastructure. 
2 For example, see Qian and Weingast (1997). Fiscal federalism in the United States is considered in 
the four papers that comprise the “Symposium on Fiscal Federalism” which appears in the JEL, Autumn 
1997.   8
The contribution of this paper, distinct from previous work, is my regard for 
the representative government agent, who exists irrespective of structural organization 
of the state, in the context of a generalized macroeconomic model. I liken the 
representative public agent to a local monopolist who is able to exploit her market 
power due to a lack of proper accountability. Her incentives exist irrespective of the 
degree of fiscal federalism within her society. Although several authors have explored 
aspects of accountability and fiscal federalism,
3 none have considered the more 
general macroeconomic implications of decentralization of public authority amongst 
the agents of the government. 
Almost anyone in the public employ may exploit his position as an agent of 
the government. Whether or not the agent does so and to what extent she capitalizes 
on her position of power depends primarily on the incentives and the constraints. The 
incentives are similar irrespective of the society in question, the underlying market 
structure of government gives the decentralized public agent local monopoly power. 
Differences amongst countries appear in the formal and informal constraints that 
temper the public agents ability to exploit her position.  
The implications of the principal agent problem that stems from decentralized 
control over government services by agents are great. Policy makers, especially those 
in developing countries, are keenly aware their importance. The impact of 
decentralization on development is most readily apparent in large developing 
countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and China. In such places, neither the 
central nor the local government is capable of exercising the optimal degree of control 
                                                 
3 Most notably Seabright (1996) discusses political accountability in a theoretical model with central 
and locally elected officials competing over control rights. Other papers addressing different 
dimensions of this principal-agent problem include Besley and Case (1995), Beasley and Coate (1999) 
and Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (1999).   9
over its representatives. Public agents may act unilaterally or could be subject to 
capture by elites, as suggested by Bardhan and Mooherjee (2001). Although specific 
reasons for this lack of control vary from country to country, some generalizations 
may be made. Government agents expect to personally profit from their positions in 
the public sector. It is one of the main incentives to seek public employment. 
Furthermore, the general population may expect a certain degree of dishonesty or 
corruption of public servants. In many places, there exist long and rich histories of 
public sector corruption. Its existence is treated as a fact of life that all must be 
resigned to endure.
4  
Every single element that makes up the macroeconomy, irrespective of its role, 
may be classified as either a public or a private asset. Every worker or piece of capital 
is either employed or rented by the government or is not. This important accounting 
fact allows us to classify each and every good or service available to society by its 
state of nature. Therefore, tangible forms of public capital such as roads, schools, 
buildings, and physical infrastructure as well as less tangible public infrastructure 
such as property rights, law and order, and contract enforcement, which are usually 
taken for granted in the aggregate production function research, may be examined in 
their roles in the private production process. Furthermore, the importance of the 
accounting constraint that governs both labor and capital justifies the explicit 
consideration of an aggregate private sector production function versus an aggregate 
public sector production function.  
                                                 
4 For example, in the Middle East, payment of Baksheesh is part of the expected protocol when dealing 
with a public official. Similarly in Paraguay, where cronyism and corruption were institutionalised 
during a 35 dictatorship, private citizens expect to pay speed money, known there as coima, for 
anything from phone service to passports. Examples in the literature that document this phenomenon 
include Geddes and Neto (1992), Barreto (1996), and Crook and Manor  (1998).    10
The difference in market organization between the public and private sectors 
combined with the binding accounting constraint over all resources are of the utmost 
importance to understanding the equilibrium price and quantity of labor, capital, 
public goods and private goods. The overwhelming majority of research on the role of 
public infrastructure within an aggregate production function framework assumes that 
public capital is an unpaid input to production. Most authors assume that public 
capital is trivially produced from tax revenue. This wholly inadequate convention 
conveniently sidesteps the issue of a public sector production function as well as any 
issues relating to the resource accounting constraint while maintaining the real cost, in 
taxes, of public goods and services. Furthermore, the trivializing assumption that 
GY τ =  does not account for the significant labor and capital inputs in public sector 
production. 
The paper presents an alternative methodology to modeling the state’s role as 
the producer of public infrastructure within the context of an aggregate production 
function that explicitly considers the government’s natural monopoly as well as the 
general equilibrium constraint on resources. The basic framework is well documented 
in both the theoretical and applied literatures on public capital. One of the simplest 
treatments of public goods from growth theory is Barro (1990).
5 Papers that estimate 
the return to public infrastructure within an aggregate production function generally 
follow Aschauer (1989,1990).
6 A common assumption adopted to capture non-
exclusivity, which is shared by all of the theoretical models that underlie this research, 
is that public capital is an unpaid input within the production process. In other words, 
                                                 
5 Other papers that explicitly consider infrastructure in the context of an endogenous growth model 
include Barreto (2000), Dasgupta (1999), Turnofsky (1996), and Futagami, Morita, & Shibata (1995). 
6 Other notable papers that estimate the positive impact of public capital include Morrison and 
Schwartz (1996), Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994), Berndt and Hansson (1992), Lynde and Richmond   11
the cost function faced by firms resembles the following, 
() ,, G Y K L G P G wL rK wL rK =+ + = +  where  0 G P =  and all public services, G, are 
paid for by tax revenues.  This framework fails to account for either the inherent 
difference in market structure between the public sector and the private sector or the 
public-private accounting constraint over resources. 
I consider an aggregate production function where public infrastructure is a 
productive input. Although subsidized by tax revenues, public goods must still be 
explicitly paid for via user fees.
7 Therefore, the private sector’s demand for public 
goods is downward sloping.
8 But unlike capital and labor, which by assumption, are 
provided competitively, government services are sold at an endogenously determined 
premium. The premium is a function of the income tax rate, the opportunity cost to 
the public agent, which through a competitive labor market, equals the private sector 
wage, and the marginal product of infrastructure in terms of final goods. In its 
simplest construction, the premium equals the difference between the marginal 
product of public capital and the marginal product of private capital. The premium 
may be observed in the literature by the higher than expected estimates of 
infrastructure productivity. The empirical models generally regress output on total 
capital, total labor, and total government. By not explicitly considering the accounting 
                                                                                                                                            
(1992), and  Munnell (1990). However, papers that find a negligible impact of public capital include 
Holtz-Eakin (1994), Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992), and Hulten and Schwab (1984, 1991). 
7 User fees for public services are described analytically by Samuelson (1954). More recent examples 
include Barreto (2000) in the context of an endogenous growth model with corruption and Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2001) in the context of fiscal federalism within developing countries.  
8 Dasgupta (1999) considers non-rival infrastructure inputs that are also purchased by the private sector. 
Similar to the approach taken here, the price of infrastructure is determined by equating the supply by 
the government to the demand by the private sector.   12
constraint, the relative size of government is smaller and its estimated productivity is 
consequently higher.
9 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical 
framework that describes the allocation of labor and capital across the public and 
private sectors. The resulting allocations determine the price and quantity of provision 
of public goods. Section 3 estimates the productivity of capital, labor, and public 
infrastructure within the context of the allocative framework. The results, exclusive to 
OECD countries, suggest the relatively high productivity of public labor and of 
private capital. Section 4 considers the model in the purely theoretical context of 
endogenous growth. The decentralized agent model predicts that the steady state 
effective capital-labor ratio is much greater than traditional growth models that 
account for a public sector might predict. Section 5 presents some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. The  Model 
I consider an aggregate production function model where the state is an 
intermediate factor of production which not only requires real resources but is also 
administered by self-seeking, albeit decentralized, public agents. The representative 
firm pays user fees in addition to income taxes to the government in return for service. 
The user fee, i.e. the price of government services, has a limit of zero as the tax rate 
approaches its optimum. In other words, a society with perfect information could set 
taxes exactly right such that the user fee for public goods is truly zero
10 and 
                                                 
9 Estimates vary widely from very high to low to insignificant. Aschauer (1989, 1990) estimates values 
for β  from .38 to .56. Subsequent literature pushed this estimate down to something closer to .30. The 
lowest estimate belong to Eberts (1990), who found β  to be .03. 
10 This is the market solution to the principal agent problem between agents. As PG approaches zero, so 
do the monopoly rents available to the public agent.   13
consequently the model collapses to the more traditional treatment of public goods 
within the private production process. In practice therefore, the second best outcome 
implies the user fees for public goods must be positive. 
As long as user fees are positive, the representative private agent faces a 
downward sloping demand for public goods. The demand for a service is unaffected 
by the good’s nature in terms of its non-rivalry. On the other hand, the quantity 
demanded certainly changes in reaction to the supply of the good, which of course is a 
function of the good’s nature and the tax rate. Previous work in the corruption 
literature that assumes a downward sloping demand for public goods includes 
Schliefer and Vishny (1990), Barreto (2000), and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2001). 
In a perfect world, the selfless government employs labor and capital at their 
competitive rates as well as collects taxes in order to provide society with its services 
as efficiently as possible. Optimal provision of any normal good, such as G, from the 
theoretical point of view, is equivalent to the perfectly competitive equilibrium. We 
may therefore consider a government that employs resources to produce an 
intermediate good where deviation from the perfect competition benchmark represents 
allocative inefficiency. 
Irrespective of whether one believes in the validity of the aggregate production 
function, it has several unequivocally useful applications.
11 Modern macroeconomic 
growth theory, on the other hand, is largely based the use of aggregate production 
functions that are conceptually derived from microeconomic foundations. Theoretical 
research that follows Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965) and later Lucas 
                                                 
11 Criticisms of the APF generally follow Fisher (1965, 1969, 1971, 1983) who developed a set of 
theoretical conditions that are so rigid that successful aggregation, as implied by the APF framework, is 
all but impossible. Fisher’s criticism, if taken to heart, completely discounts the use of the aggregate 
production function in order to estimate the productivity of infrastructure. See Felipe (2001).   14
(1988), implicitly adopts Samuelson’s (1962) view that the aggregate production 
function is a useful parable to illustrate important facets about the production process 
and the consequent growth of output per capita. I adopt this latter view. Although I 
estimate the model given its aggregate production function framework, I make no 
claim about the models validity for estimation purposes.
12 
I consider the two sectors, public and private, separately. Given the non-trivial 
accounting constraint, the two sectors compete over both labor and capital. The 
inherent difference in market structures between sectors justifies the explicit 
consideration of the equilibrium wage and rental rate as the result of competition 
between the two separate aggregate production processes. Therefore, the model may 
be expressed generally as follows. 
() ,, YY YF K L G =  and  () ,, GG GH KL τ =  
subject to 
YG K KK =+    and  YG L LL =+  
Suppose that the public production function, which requires both capital and 
labor, produces public infrastructure. The private production function, which requires 
capital, labor, and public infrastructure, produces consumable goods on which all 
agents within society, public and private, ultimately depend. The privately employed 
representative laborer is paid his marginal product according to the demand from the 
competitive representative firm and the opportunity cost of private versus public 
employment. Perfect mobility of resources guarantee the representative public agent is 
also paid her marginal product, which must equal the private sector wage.  
                                                 
12 The econometric exercise found herein compares the results from this specification to those of the 
traditional aggregate production function estimations that generally follow Aschauer (1989, 1990).   15
The government is a monopoly whose services are centrally mandated while 
decentrally administered by its agents. The relationship between the government and 
its agent is governed by the assumption that the public agent can neither directly affect 
the marginal product of the public good or service, i.e. its price, nor the marginal 
product of her work effort, i.e. her wage. Instead the user fee for public goods is 
determined by the endogenous allocation of labor and capital across the public and 
private sectors. The second best resource allocation is a proxy for the less than optimal 
effort exerted by public agents. 
Suppose the private sector produces all of society’s consumable output 
through a production function that is homogeneous of degree one in capital (KY), labor 
(LY), and infrastructure (G). 
  ()
1 ,, YY Y Y YF K L G A K G L
α β α β −− ==  (2.1) 
The central government collects taxes proportional to final production and hands over 
the revenue to its agents who produce and then sell the public good to the private 
sector. The public sector production function is defined as follows.
13 
  () ( )
11 ,, , GG GG G G G G
GG
YY
GH KL G KL A K L A K L
PP
γγ γγ τ τ β
τ
βτ
−− = = += +=
−
%  (2.2) 
Both sectors are subject to the accounting constraints,  YG K KK =+  and  YG L LL =+  
respectively. The central government would prefer its agents work such that G is 
provided as efficiently as possible. Thus the competitive and therefore optimal price 
of G is determined by  0 GG G PG w L r K Ψ= − − = . Competitively produced G is the 
optimum and thereby serves as a benchmark. The optimal tax rate in the above   16
framework is simply 
* τβ =  where lim 0 G P
τβ → = . In the perfect world benchmark, the 
elasticity of infrastructure is exactly known, taxes are set optimally, and government 
services, provided at the competitive equilibrium, are consumed at zero cost.  
In an imperfect world, the elasticity of public infrastructure is not exactly 
known such that τβ < .
14 Furthermore, if the decentralized public agents accept the 
value of public capital as well as the wage rate as given, competitive resource markets 
insure that their opportunity costs equal the private sector rental rate of capital and 
wage respectively. Therefore, the decentralized public agent maximizes her welfare 
function given competitive resource markets. The superscript bar over the variable 
denotes the public agent’s inability to directly affect its value.  
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Notice that the competitive private wage rate, w, is the marginal labor cost to the 
public agent. The marginal benefit of working in the public sector is the competitive 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Taxes lower the marginal cost of government such that lim 0 G P
τβ →
= . Furthermore, at the optimal tax 




=  and the model collapses to the more 
typical framework where public capital is an unpaid input. 
14 It is important to note that the optimal tax rate of  * τβ =  insures that government services are 
consumed at zero cost. This is because lim 0 G P
τβ →
=  is independent of how close government production 
can approximate the competitive equilibrium. This corner solution strictly limits consideration of the 
tax rate to 0 τβ ≤< .   17
wage plus the premium available to the public agent. Therefore, resources allocation 
is determined by marginal benefit equalizing marginal cost. The allocation rules 
governing labor and capital may be defined as follows.
15 
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It is important to note that equations (2.6) through (2.9) are indeed socially 
sub-optimal allocation algorithms. One way for the social planner to overcome the 
principle agent problem is to provide public services as if they were competitive. 
Therefore, the benchmark rules for optimal resource allocation are defined as follows. 
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The only difference between the allocation algorithms is the constant, 2, that 
appears in (2.6) through (2.9) but is absent in (2.10) through (2.13). Therefore, it is 
                                                 
15 See Appendix 1 for the derivation.   18
possible to analyze resource allocation more generally as follows: 












α βγ τ φ =  where  1 φ ≥  determines the degree 
of allocative inefficiency due to decentralization.
16  
I contend that (2.6) through (2.9) represent second best equilibrium allocations 
resulting from local welfare maximization by decentralized public agents while (2.10) 
through (2.13) represent the first best socially optimum allocations. Figure 1 illustrates 
the two benchmark equilibria. Although L* is the second best equilibrium allocation 
of labor given decentralized agents and L
pc is the equilibrium allocation of labor given 
the competitive optimum, that is not to say that other resource allocations may not be 
considered. In fact, one could analyze the implications of any resource allocation of LY 
versus LG. For example, perfect information as well as complete impunity of public 
agents might leads to an allocation of L
m. The problem with L
m is that the public agent 
effectively gets a larger slice of a smaller pie. Relative to her private sector 
counterpart, the public agent may be wealthier, but she would still have been better off 
in absolute terms at L*. Irrespective of whether the reader believes that L* is indeed 
an equilibrium, it is nonetheless clear that L
pc is the best that society can hope to 
achieve and consequently any movement away from L
pc is sub-optimal. 
There are three important observations regarding how the model can and 
should be practically applied. First, the model predicts rates of resource usage as a 
function of the production elasticities and the tax rate. Along these lines, the model 
also predicts that optimal resource usage is defined by (2.10) through (2.13) versus 
second best equilibrium resource usage which is defined by (2.6) through (2.9). 
                                                 
16 Any resource allocation may be represented by changing this constant in which a  1 φ =  yields the 
competitive equilibrium and a  2 φ =  yields the decentralized public agent equilibrium. In Figure 1, any   19
Therefore, for any reasonable set of values for α , β , γ  and τ , it is always the case that 
*
pc
LL z z <  and  *
pc
KK z z < . Thus the further the economy is from optimal allocation, 
the lower is the relative resource usage by government.
17  
The implications of this observation are relatively straightforward. One might 
hypothesize that industrialized countries are closer to L
pc than developing ones and 
movement away from L
pc represents the prevalence of public inefficiency through 
corruption. This view that corruption stems from the monopolistic exploitation of 
public services is discussed in Schliffer and Vishny (1990). But one must take care 
when making a comparison of this type because the results, 
LDC IND
LL z z <  and 
LDC IND
KK zz <  as reflecting greater corruption in the LDC, only holds strictly when α , 
β , γ  and τ  are equivalent across the two countries in question. 
The second observation pertains to the coefficient values. They may, and in 
fact are quite likely to be, different across countries. For the theoretical model to be 
consistent with the stylized fact that the average government of a developing country 
employs relatively more of society’s labor and relatively less of society’s capital than 
the average government of an industrialized economy, barring differences in tax rate 
across countries, at least one of the three elasticities, α , β  or γ , must differ between 
representative countries. 
Consider the simplest scenario first. Assume that the production elasticities of 
public versus private capital, α  and β , and the degree of allocative inefficiency, φ , are 
the same across countries, but the elasticity on capital in the public production 
function, γ , is different. If the productivity of public capital is greater in industrialized 
                                                                                                                                            
value  1 φ > is equivalent to movement to the left of L
pc and any value 01 φ << is equivalent to 
movement right of L
pc. 
17 I only consider allocations to the left of L
PC, but the model is not limited thus.   20
countries than in LDC’s, the implication is that infrastructure development in 
industrialized countries is more capital intensive than in LDC’s. In terms of the 
model, 
IND LDC γγ > , given 
IND LDC αα = , 
IND LDC ββ =  and 
IND LDC φφ = , insures that 
both inequalities, 
IND LDC
KK zz >  and 
IND LDC
LL zz < , hold. 
  Alternatively, the output elasticities, α  and or β , may also differ across 
countries. If we assume the elasticity on public capital, β , is constant and that 
IND LDC αα < , then homogeneity requires that () () 11
IND LDC α β α β −− > −− . This 
implies that private capital in industrialized countries is less productive than private 
capital in developing countries.
18 If β  actually decreases with development as the 
endogenous and traditional growth theories suggest, and 
IND LDC αα < , then the 
inequalities, 
IND LDC
KK zz >  and 
IND LDC
LL zz < , hold so long as the elasticity of capital 
in the public sector production function is restricted by 
IND LDC γγ > . In other words, 
while the relative return on private capital is relatively lower in industrialized 
countries than in developing ones, the relative return on public capital is greater in 
industrialized economies than in developing ones. Intuitively, this suggests that 
factories are relatively more productive in developing countries while labor is 
relatively more productive in industrialized ones. Simultaneously, a courthouse is 
relatively more effective in industrialized countries while a police officer is relatively 
more effective in developing ones. 
  The final observation pertains to the tax rate, τ . If α , β , γ , and φ  are equal 
across countries, then differing tax rates across countries yields 
  low high
LL zz
τ τ <  and 
                                                 
18 Nourzad (2000) found no difference in the marginal productivity of public capital between 
industrialized and developing countries but found that the marginal productivity of private capital to be 
relatively higher in developing economies.   21
   low high
KK zz
τ τ < . Moreover, the further the tax rate is below the optimal rate, the 
higher is the effective price of public capital. Since the effective tax rate in LDC’s is 
generally less than the effective tax rate in industrialized countries,
19 the model 
predicts that LDC’s will suffer less growth effects due to taxation but at the cost of 
lower welfare and greater income inequality. 
  Table 1 presents the relative resources usage rates and the average tax rates for 
a selection of countries. Given the three observations from above, several testable 
hypotheses may be drawn from the data. First, compare the USA to the UK where we 
observe that 
USA UK
LL z z <  and 
USA UK
KK z z > . Recall that if α , β , γ , and φ  are equal 
across these two countries and the only difference is average tax rates, then both the 
public labor and the public capital usage rates should be lower in the UK. Since they 
are not, then one or all of the coefficients must be different between the two countries. 
Second, comparing the USA to France, we observe that 
USA France
LL zz <  and 
USA France
KK zz < . If the difference in the average tax rate between these two countries 
accounts for observed resource usage, then it should be that all of the other 
coefficients are the equal. Third, comparing the USA to Australia (or Canada), we 
observe that 
USA Australia
LL zz <  and 
USA Australia
KK zz < . Although the observed inequalities 
are consistent with the USA’s lower tax rate, the difference is so marginal that it 
would seem unlikely to be the root of the difference in labor usage. Fourth, compare 
the USA to Japan where we observe 
USA Japan
LL zz >  and 
USA Japan
KK zz < . Since Japan 
has a lower average tax rate than the USA, unless the coefficients are different, both 
usage rates should be lower in the USA. Fifth, compare the USA to Portugal (or Italy). 
                                                 
19 Average tax rate in European countries is strictly greater than 30% versus the average tax rate in 
Mexico and Turkey are 17% and 15% respectively. [so. World Bank Indicators, 1994]   22
Although the usage rates are almost equal, what if the government of Portugal is less 
efficient than that of the USA due to corruption? If so, then one or all of the 
coefficients must differ for the usage ratios to be equal.  These hypotheses are the 
subject of the next section. 
 
3.  Empirical Estimates of the Coefficients within the Model  
    The following econometric exercise estimates the values of the coefficients, α , 
β  and γ , for a panel of 16 OECD countries. I estimate the three coefficients using the 
dynamic equivalents to equations (2.1) and (2.2). This is convenient because it is not 
only theoretically justifiable, but also removes any unit roots in the data. I estimate the 
following four equations. 
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Equation (3.3) is the simply equation (3.1) with the growth rate of G, equation (3.2), 
imbedded into it. Equation (3.4) is estimated for comparison purposes. It represents 
the more typical experiment, following Aschauer (1989), to estimate the elasticity of 
output with respect to public infrastructure versus private capital. The relationship 
between the data used to estimate this last equation and those used in the previous 
three estimations may be summarized by the following accounting constraints, 
GDP=Y+G, L=LG+LY, and K=KG+KY.   23
    It is preferable to estimate the levels growth of KG, KY, G, and Y than their per 
capita equivalents for three reasons. First, the theoretical values of the coefficients 
from the equations defined in levels are identical to those values from the equations in 
intensive form. Second, modern econometric software allows one to easily impose 
restrictions, such as constant returns to scale, on the coefficient estimates. Third, it is 
easier to estimate equation (3.3) in levels. In theory, the growth rates of public and 
private labor are equal, but in practice they are not. Therefore, the per capita version 
of equation (3.3) would need to also contain a term for the difference in the rates of 
growth of LY and LG. Again, given the ability to easily restrict coefficients, estimation 
of per capita data is unnecessary and, in this case, cumbersome. 
    The data is an annual panel of 16 countries from 1970 until 1996.
20 The data is 
from the OECD, who conveniently separates output, fixed capital formation, and 
employment into the two categories, total industries and producers of government 
services.
21 Unfortunately, data on the stocks of public and private capital do not exist 
in a comparable series across countries. This problem has been addressed in many 
previous studies. The closest paper to this one in terms of data is Ford and Poret 
(1991), who use essentially the same OECD data that I do. 
    The econometric methodology employed is similar to the panel study by 
Nourzad (2000). Table 2 presents the results of the five benchmark estimations, (3.1) 
through (3.4) plus one additional, i.e. equation (3.1) with a fitted value from equation 
                                                 
20 The panel is not exactly balanced. Canadian data is from 1970-93. Danish data is from 1970-95. 
German (west) data is from 1970-92. Luxemburg’s data is from 1970-91. Dutch data is from 1970-93. 
Portuguese data is from 1977-93. Swedish data is from 1970-94. British data is from 1971-95. Using a 
smaller balanced panel of 15 countries from 1971-95 does not significantly change any of the results. 
21 The data source is various years of the OECD, National Accounts, Detailed Tables, Volume II. The 
relevant tables are 4, 12 and 15.   24
(3.2).
22 They are specified as classical linear regression models [CLRM] with no 
control for country or period specific effects. Table 3 presents the results of the five 
equations specified as one way fixed effects models with controls for country specific 
effects [FE-country] and period specific effects [FE-period].
23 The capital and labor 
usage ratios reported in the previous section suggest likely differences in coefficients 
values across countries. In light of this, I interact the coefficient estimates of α , β  and 
γ  for the entire panel with the country dummies. Table 4 reports the results of the five 
equations when the coefficient estimates are allowed to vary across countries. 
    The results from all of the experiments suggest that only the productivity of 
private capital differs across countries. The best estimates of those differences result 
from estimation of equation (3.3):[FE-period + FE-alpha] on table 4. Furthermore, the 
productivity of government represented by β , which is statistically the same across 
OECD countries, is significant and equal to anywhere from .11 to as high as .37. In 
general though, the data suggest that business cycles are indeed important and the 
coefficient on G is closer to the lower estimate. This is in sharp contrast to the most of 
the literature that follows Ashauer (1989), which finds much higher elasticities of 
output with respect to public infrastructure. It is interesting to note that the highest 
estimate for β  results from estimation of equation (3.4) on Table 2. Recall that this 
equation represents the more typical experiment to estimate the productivity of public 
infrastructure. The estimates of γ  suggest that the relative productivity of public 
                                                 
22 This effectively makes public infrastructure endogenous in the private production function and 
thereby allows some feedback from equation (3.2) to equation (3.1). See Flores de Frutos and Pereira 
(1993) for additional discussion. 
23 The corresponding random effect model specification of the five equations in Tables 2 and 3 were 
also tested. Based on Hausman’s specification test, in all cases, the random effect models may be 
rejected at high levels of significance in favour of the corresponding fixed effect formulations. A two 
way fixed effects model with controls for country as well as periods was also estimated. The results 
suggest that in the presence of period effects, country effects are not jointly significant. In the presence   25
capital also does not vary across OECD countries and is equal to something between 
.06 and .22. Unfortunately, this is by no means a strong result. 
    Using the estimates from table 4, we may now address the hypotheses of the 
previous section. As the empirical results suggest, I assume that β  and γ  are constant 
across countries while α  varies. We observe that 
USA UK
LL z z <  and 
USA UK
KK z z > . The 
tax effect can explain the labor inequality but not the observed capital inequality. 
Using the estimates from equation (3.3):[FE-period + FE-alpha], the elasticity of 
private capital in the USA is .14 versus that of the UK is .22. This is exactly what we 
should expect to find. 
    The second observation is that 
USA France
LL zz <  and 
USA France
KK zz < . Since the 
tax rate of the US is lower than that of France, we would have expected that the value 
of α  to be very close to that of the USA. In fact, it seems that α FRA=.19, which is 
above the US estimate. Since the difference in private capital productivity between 
France and the USA is smaller that that between the UK and the USA, it is still quite 
possible that the theory is consistent with the empirical evidence. 
    The third observation is that 
USA Australia
LL zz <  and 
USA Australia
KK zz < . The 
estimates of α  suggest that α AUT=.18, which is again higher than in the USA. Since 
the tax rate difference is so small, the higher productivity of private capital in 
Australia is to be expected. 
    The fourth observation is that 
USA Japan
LL zz >  and 
USA Japan
KK zz < . Given the tax 
rate differential alone, we would expect both usage rates to be lower in Japan. The 
estimate of private sector productivity in Japan is α JAP=.27, which is much higher 
                                                                                                                                            
of country effects, period effects are still jointly significant, but less so that the one way fixed effects 
model with controls for period.   26
than the US estimate. In this case, the theory fails somewhat since the higher private 
capital productivity in Japan should raise public labor usage and lower public capital 
usage. 
    The final observation considers the usage rates between the USA and Portugal 
which are almost equal. The higher tax rate in Portugal, ceteris paribus, drives the 
expected usage rates of both public capital and public labor up. The observed 
productivity of private capital in Portugal, which is α POR=.18, reinforces higher public 
labor usage but implies lower public capital usage. The only possible offsetting factor 
that might explain the observed similarity in the public labor usage rate is if 
Portuguese government is less efficient due to corruption than that of the US, i.e. 
POR USA φφ > . It is interesting to note that of the OECD countries sampled, the average 
bureaucratic efficiency is 8.90.
24 Only in Italy (BIITA=6.33) and in Portugal 
(BIPOR=5.58) are the indices lower than in France (BIFRA=8.25). In other words, if 
greater of autonomy of public agents leads to more corruption, and if that is indeed 
what is captured by these bureaucratic efficiency indices, then again, the theory is 
quite consistent with the evidence. 
    In summary, the data, for the most part, support the explicit specification of 
the private aggregate production function versus the public aggregate production 
function. Given further study with other data, the next step is to explicitly consider 
developing countries versus industrialized ones. I leave that to the future. 
 
                                                 
24 Business International (BI) corruption indicator average 1980-1993, collected by Mauro (1995): 10 
(lowest corruption), 0 (highest corruption)   27
4.  Theoretical Implications of the Model 
The theoretical implications of the model are far reaching. Almost any 
endogenous growth model that is based on an aggregate production function 
framework, albeit with microeconomic foundations, can be easily altered to reflect a 
productive government with real resources costs.  By doing so, one can compare the 
original work which reflects a trivially produced public sector where GY τ =  to a 
more robust version that includes a decentralized public sector as a departure from the 
utopian optimum. Although there is a wealth of literature to choose from, some well 
known papers on endogenous growth that readily lend themselves to this analysis 
include Lucas (1988), Barro (1990), Romer (1986, 1990), and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992). 
The paper by Lucas (1988) is arguably a synthesis of the research pioneered by 
Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) and the model attributed to 
Solow (1956) and Swan (1956). Lucas describes the basic endogenous growth model 
where output is a function of technology augmented labor and capital. The rate of 
return on investment and the consequent saving are independent of the growth rate 
which is described by the Euler equation, growth_rate=IES⋅ (MPK-discount_rate)-
tech_growth_rate, where IES is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  
In an extension to this line of research, Barro (1990) introduces government as 
a productive input, which is homogenous of degree one, within the dynamic 
production function. Public services are trivially produced and completely funded by a 
proportional income tax. For all tax rates,  0 τ > , the private return on investment is 
lower than the social return and the decentralized economy grows slower than is   28
socially optimal. The optimal tax rate and consequent size of government, using the 
notation from above, is simply  * gy τβ ==. 
Appendix 2 describes the analytical solution of a productive government with 
decentralized agents within an endogenous growth model. The model has labor and 
capital as in Lucas (1988) while public services are subject to diminishing returns as 
in Barro (1990). Therefore, suppose there exist two separable agents with identical 
preferences whose competition results in the allocation of the economy’s available 
labor and capital. The agents maximize welfare, which is a function of consumption 
per worker. Upper case characters represent levels and lower case represent per 
effective capita. n is the exogenous growth rate of population and χ  is the exogenous 
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The representative private agent, denoted by subscript y, owns the representative firm 
and receives income from wages, rental capital and sales of output to the entire 
economy. Taxes are assessed on wage and capital income. I assume that all capital is 
ultimately owned by the private sector. After tax income from final good sales 
accounts for private sector resource income but does not account for capital rental by 
the public sector. 
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The price of y must be explicitly specified since it is possible to have greater dollar 








The representative public agent, denoted by subscript g, receives wage income 
which is taxed plus whatever public goods premium that she can garner from the 
administration of the public sector. Public goods are produced by the government at 
resource cost. 
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The two representative agents independently choose consumption and 
consequent saving to maximize their independent optimal consumption paths. Capital 
evolves as a result of the sum total of savings. Since the two agents have identical 
preferences, they necessarily have equal saving rates as well.
26 Thus the growth rate of 
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The dynamic adjustment process is similar to Lucas (1988). The results may be 


























                                                 
25 If taxes are set optimally at  * τβ = , then the PY=1. 
26 See Appendix 2 for proof of this assertion.   30
There are some points worth noting. The relationship between the growth of 
output and that of consumption is independent of the effects of decentralized public 
agents. The further the country is from the competitive benchmark, the smaller is the 
proportion of public to private capital, and the lower is the marginal product of private 
capital. To understand the significance of equation (4.9), consider the Lucas (1988) 
model altered to include a Barro (1990) type government that is trivially produced 






















The differences between the model with a productive government and Lucas-
Barro model lie in the capital labor ratios at the steady state and in the rate of 
adjustment that leads to the steady state. For any set of values for α , β , γ  and φ , the 
steady state capital labor ratio, given the explicitly specified public sector, is far 
greater than the Lucas-Barro framework predicts. For example, consider a 
hypothetical starting point of one unit of capital and one unit of labor with the 
technology parameter, A, also equal to one, such that the initial effective capital labor 
ratio is 00 0 01 KA L k == . It is important to remember that that the transition to the 
steady state is unique.
28 Figure 2 plots the simulation results from three separate 
experiments, a Lucas-Barro model, a Lucas model with a productive albeit 
decentralized public sector (i.e. φ =2) and a Lucas model with a decentralized 
competitive public sector (i.e. φ =1). The coefficients on K and G are α =.35 and β =.25 
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respectively and the tax rate is τ =.24.
29 In each case, the heavy line is the unique 
saddle path to the steady state and the lighter line is the reference describing all points 
in which the growth of effective per capita capital is zero.  
The models each converge to their respective steady states defined by modified 
golden rules. The simulation values at the steady state equilibrium are summarized in 
Table 5. Notice that the steady state effective capital labor ratio is k*=6.73, k*=39.54 
and k*=56.16 respectively. The saddle path is much steeper in the Lucas model and 
the steady state consequently occurs much sooner. Another way to compare transitions 
to the steady states is to consider the growth rates at any point away from the steady 
state. Figures 3 plots the changing growth rate of consumption per effective capita as 
each model converges to its steady state. Again, it is quite evident that the trivializing 
assumption that  tt GY τ =  implies a much quicker transition to the steady state with a 
lower capital labor ratio and lower per capita consumption. A productive albeit 
decentralized government model predicts almost six times more capital per unit of 
effective labor at the steady state than the Barro-Lucas model. The competitive 
benchmark predicts over nine times more capital per unit of effective labor at the 
steady state. In general, this suggests that government efficiency is reflected by a 
higher effective capital labor ratio. 
The empirical results herein reinforce the results of Nourzad (2001) in that only 
α  differs across countries, while β  and γ  are constant. Figure 4 depicts the saddle path 
with a lower elasticity of private capital ceteris paribus, a lower tax rate ceteris paribus 
and a lower private capital elasticity combined with a lower tax rate. As the 
                                                                                                                                            
28 See the textbook by Romer (2001) for details. 
29 The other relevant coefficient values pertaining to figures 2, 3 and 4 are the coefficient on public 
capital, γ =.5, the growth rate of technology, χ =.03, the growth rate of population, n=.02, the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion, θ =.99, and the discount rate, ρ =.03.   32
productivity of private capital relative to private labor falls, so does the steady state 
effective capital labor ratio and the per capita consumption. Therefore, if developing 
countries suffer from lower private capital productivity, then one would expect 
tendency toward a lower steady state effective capital labor ratio and a quicker 
transition to the steady state. Furthermore, a shock to an LDC should have a more 
pronounced growth effect but a shorter life span. 
Lower private capital productivity combined with a tax that is relatively further 
from its optimal rate reinforce each other by both implying lower steady state effective 
capital labor ratios. If one assumes that industrialized countries also have more 
efficient resource allocations between sectors (i.e. φ  is closer to 1 than to 2), then 
developing countries tend toward a steady state at far lower effective capital labor 
ratio and per capita consumption than do industrialized ones. 
Finally, consider the steady state equilibrium values across the various scenarios 
summarized in Table 5. There are several points worth noting. The effective capital 
labor ratio in row 6 decreases as the scenario differs from the benchmark competitive 
equilibrium with optimal taxes. Although lower private capital productivity (i.e. 
columns 5 & 6) lowers the consumption per effective capita (i.e. row 3) and 
consequently the welfare per capita (i.e. rows 33 & 34), the implications of sub-
optimal taxation are greater (i.e. compare columns 3 & 4 versus columns 3 & 5). This 
is also evident in the effect of taxation on the level of public goods per effective capita 
(i.e. row 7). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper brings to light the problems resulting from the generally accepted, 
although wholly inadequate convention of assuming that publicly produced goods are   33
provided to the private sector at zero user cost and funded solely by tax revenues. The 
assumption completely ignores the public-private accounting constraint over 
resources. As a result the relative level of G versus L and K within a constant returns 
production function, Y=F(G,K,L), is significantly lower and its estimated productivity 
is consequently significantly higher. Empirical estimates herein suggest that the 
elasticity of public goods is closer to .13, far lower than that found by Ashauer (1989) 
and others. From the theoretical standpoint, the assumption greatly skews the 
equilibrium capital labor ratio as well as the per effective capita consumption. The 
inclusion of the accounting constraint dramatically changes the relative price of 
private versus public goods and consequently the relative price of consumption and 
saving. The transition to the steady state becomes more gradual and the resulting 
equilibrium is characterized by relatively more capital per unit of effective labor at a 
higher level of consumption per effective capita. 
There are several conclusions that may be drawn from the preceding analysis. 
First, any degree of decentralization that may be exploited by government agents will 
necessarily lead to sub-optimal allocations of labor and capital between the public and 
private sectors. Therefore less publicly produced goods will be offered to the private 
sector at a higher price. The resulting rent accrued by public agents is spent along with 
private sector income on private sector output. This effectively means more nominal 
income chasing less real goods. Second, the principle agent problem may be 
effectively addressed by a concerned central government by setting the income tax 
rate exactly equal to the productivity of public goods within the private production 
function. Unfortunately, imperfect information by government makes this highly 
unlikely. There are two caveats to this conclusion. One, tax substitution and the ability   34
to levy consumption taxes would likely lower the optimal income tax rate.
30 Two, the 
government could set the tax rate above the estimated optimum. Although inefficient, 
the principal agent problem effectively disappears irrespective of the degree of 
decentralization as the price of public goods approaches zero.  
The model predicts the more inefficient the allocation of resources and the 
further the tax rate is from optimal, the lower is the steady state effective capital labor 
ratio and the steeper is the saddle path to the equilibrium. Therefore, if governments in 
developing countries are less able or desirous to control their agents, they are 
effectively more decentralized and thus have greater freedom to exploit their positions 
of power. In such cases, we should expect a steeper saddle path to a steady state 
defined by less capital and consumption per capita. An intuitive interpretation is that 
business cycles in developing countries are shorter than those in industrialized 
countries but have higher amplitudes, or simply are more volatile. 
The policy implications are quite straightforward. To an economy on the saddle 
path somewhere to the left of the steady state, an injection of either technology or 
labor would decrease the effective capital labor ratio, push the economy further left 
along the saddle path and manifest itself in the form of temporarily higher growth 
rates. The steeper the saddle path, the more pronounced is the growth effect of a shock 
but the shorter its life span. Therefore if a goal of an LDC is to lengthen the business 
cycle and decrease its amplitude, i.e. stabilization, then assuming the empirical results 
herein are correct, the only options are either to increase the productivity of private 
capital or set the tax rate at its optimum.  
The paper implicitly assumes that allocation of capital and labor across the two 
sectors is determined via some kind of long run institutional process. In the model, 
                                                 
30 See Barreto and Alm (2002).   35
this is represented by the coefficient φ  approaching 1. Any improvement in resource 
allocation improves private agents’ welfares at the expense of public agents’ in the 
sense that public agents get a relative smaller piece of a bigger pie. Since only private 
sector output may ultimately be consumed, it is a positive sum gain for the whole 
economy. In other words, the model conforms to the stylized fact regarding 
institutional development in which governments of industrialized countries tend to 
better serve their respective populations while governments of developing countries 
tend to better serve themselves. Moreover, the model depicts how industrialized 
countries not only tend to higher equilibrium capital labor ratio and per capita 
consumption, but they do so via business cycles that are longer and more stable.    36
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Figure 3 
Simulation Results: Growth Path Comparisons 
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Figure 4 
Simulation Results: Saddle Path Comparisons 
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 Table 1 
 
USA CANADA AUSTRALIA MEXICO JAPAN KOREA
Ky/K 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.82 0.86
Kg/K 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.14
Ly/L 0.84 0.80 0.76 0.86 0.94 0.90
Lg/L 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.14 0.06 0.10
Avg. tax rate 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.17 0.13 0.19
FRANCE ITALY PORTUGAL UK GREECE TURKEY
Ky/K 0.86 0.90 0.88 0.92 0.76 0.73
Kg/K 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.24 0.27
Ly/L 0.78 0.85 0.88 0.81 0.82 0.92
Lg/L 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.08
Avg. tax rate 0.48 0.39 0.35 0.47 0.40 0.16  
Ky/K = average across time of (gross fixed capital formation by total industries)/(gross fixed capital 
formation) & Kg/K = average across time of (gross fixed capital formation by producers of govt 
services)/(gross fixed capital formation). [so. OECD National Accounts, Vol II, Country Table 3, Items 
46, 47 & 50, various years]. {* Data for Mexico and Turkey, [so. 2002, OECD, Quarterly National 
Accounts, country Table 5a] 
Ly/L = average across time of (employment of persons by total industries)/(total employment of 
persons) & Lg/L = average across time of (government employment as percent of total employment)*, 
[so. 1996, OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1994, Table 2.15]. {* Data for Mexico = average across 
time of (employment of persons by producers of govt services)/(total employment of persons), [so. 
1997, OECD, Services, Statistics on value added and employment, Country Table II]. Data for Korea 
and Greece = average across time (employment in public administration + defence + education + health 
+ social work)/(total employment), [so. 2001, OECD, Services, Statistics on value added and 
employment, Country Table II]. Data for Turkey = share of public employment to total employment 
(1985-1999), [so. 2001, OECD Public Management Service].} 
Avg. tax rate = average across time of (total tax revenue)/(output by total industries). [so. for tax data 
from World Bank Indicators, 1994, and for output data from OECD National Accounts, Vol II, Table 
12, Items 46, various years]   44
Table 2 




Regression Type [CLRM] [CLRM] [CLRM] [CLRM] [CLRM]
Dep. Var. ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ G/G ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ GDP/GDP ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y
constant 0.0432 0.0554 0.0545 0.0365 0.0431
(0.0059) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0048)
alpha 0.1666 0.1895 0.0302 0.1882
(0.0278) (0.0279) (0.0316) (0.0280)
beta 0.2182 0.2032 0.2839 0.2024
(0.0691) (0.0551) (0.0612) (0.0525)
gamma 0.2227 0.1923
(0.0720) (0.1071)
Akaike Info. Crit. -3.8983 -3.0282 -3.8460 -3.7626 -3.8443
Adj. R Sq. 0.2983 0.0305 0.2577 0.3156 0.2594
SEE 0.0343 0.0531 0.0353 0.0367 0.0353  
Numbers in parentheses are White corrected standard errors. Numbers in bold typeface indicate 
significance with confidence of 95% or greater. 
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Table 3 
Equation (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4)
(3.1) w/ fitted G from 
(3.2)*
Regression Type [FE-country] [FE-period] [FE-country] [FE-period] [FE-country] [FE-period] [FE-country] [FE-period] [FE-country] [FE-period]
Dep. Var. ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ G/G ∆∆∆∆ G/G ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ GDP/GDP ∆∆∆∆ GDP/GDP ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y
alpha 0.1657 0.1224 0.1883 0.1277 0.1878 0.1480 0.1417 0.1187
(0.0285) (0.0283) (0.0286) (0.0302) (0.0329) (0.0324) (0.0299) (0.0300)
beta 0.2162 0.1132 0.2007 0.1184 0.2868 0.1979 0.3743 0.2061
(0.0705) (0.0726) (0.0597) (0.0376) (0.0623) (0.0775) (0.0544) (0.3136)
gamma 0.2159 0.0690 0.1800 0.0679
(0.0738) (0.0337) (0.1130) (0.1714)
Akaike Info. Crit. -3.8265 -4.0075 -2.9728 -3.3596 -3.7738 -4.0012 -3.6892 -3.7867 -3.8771 -3.9781
Adj. R Sq. 0.2740 0.4240 0.0133 0.3459 0.2329 0.4064 0.2908 0.3721 0.3098 0.3911
SEE 0.0349 0.0316 0.0536 0.0436 0.0359 0.0316 0.0374 0.0352 0.0340 0.0320
16 Countries [chi Sq] 4.2756 9.0659 4.7287 5.4106 13.8845
26 Years [chi Sq] 132.1326 324.0836 224.3183 118.7764 112.6317
Numbers in parentheses are White corrected standard errors. Numbers in bold typeface indicate significance with confidence of 95% or greater.  
* These two estimations use the fitted value for G from equation (3.2):[FE-period].   46
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Dep. Var. ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ G/G ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ GDP/GDP ∆∆∆∆ GDP/GDP ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y ∆∆∆∆ Y/Y
alpha 0.1517 0.1159 0.1437 0.1355 0.1289 0.2064 0.1401 0.1310 0.1128
(0.1122) (0.0321) (0.0522) (0.0335) (0.0332) (0.1022) (0.0351) (0.1174) (0.0316)
beta 0.0960 0.1154 0.1260 0.1074 0.1090 0.2013 0.2114 0.1684 0.1128
(0.0912) (0.0576) (0.0418) (0.0231) (0.0495) (0.0844) (0.0668) (0.3461) (0.0316)
gamma 0.2301 0.0606 -0.2100 -0.2593
(0.1684) (0.1743) (0.1892) (0.5863)
F.E. on coef. rel. to USA** alpha beta gamma alpha beta gamma alpha beta alpha beta
A UT -0.0367 0.0644 0.4876 0.0383 -0.1600 0.1980 -0.0580 0.1118 -0.0303 -0.0138
(0.1109) (0.1231) (0.3168) (0.1163) (0.2968) (1.2677) (0.1058) (0.1116) (0.1191) (0.0862)
BEL 0.0262 0.0464 -0.1354 0.0407 -0.0375 0.1733 -0.0213 0.0493 0.0520 0.0418
(0.1157) (0.0692) (0.1922) (0.0578) (0.1299) (0.8482) (0.1110) (0.0667) (0.1215) (0.0966)
CAN 0.0750 -0.2072 -0.4642 0.0942 -0.2840 1.5149 0.0523 -0.1632 0.0759 -0.0248
(0.1192) (0.1174) (0.3828) (0.0702) (0.3244) (1.4273) (0.1086) (0.1041) (0.1301) (0.0659)
DNK -0.0807 -0.0209 -0.1081 -0.0800 -0.0762 0.1796 -0.1397 -0.0270 -0.0656 0.0216
(0.1087) (0.0464) (0.1771) (0.0554) (0.0612) (0.5953) (0.1000) (0.0545) (0.1181) (0.0641)
FIN 0.0192 0.0202 -0.1127 0.0326 0.0769 -0.0526 -0.0445 0.0105 0.0366 0.0949
(0.1170) (0.0564) (0.1733) (0.0615) (0.1820) (0.8989) (0.1081) (0.0541) (0.1222) (0.0694)
FRA 0.0247 0.0120 -0.3089 0.0450 0.0639 0.2048 -0.0256 -0.0027 0.0547 0.0705
(0.1191) (0.0369) (0.2238) (0.0606) (0.0504) (0.6047) (0.1079) (0.0423) (0.1240) (0.0625)
GRW 0.0310 0.0530 -0.1047 0.0448 0.1081 0.4390 0.0040 0.0615 0.0468 0.0916
(0.1252) (0.0510) (0.1665) (0.0745) (0.1486) (0.8380) (0.1195) (0.0522) (0.1322) (0.0719)
ITA -0.1092 -0.0285 -0.0985 -0.0965 -0.0082 0.0988 -0.1488 -0.0143 -0.0915 0.0450
(0.1109) (0.0522) (0.1772) (0.0490) (0.1646) (0.7323) (0.1017) (0.0590) (0.1176) (0.0902)
JAP 0.0949 0.0479 -0.0291 0.1257 -0.4790 1.1721 0.0554 0.0499 0.1162 0.1018
(0.1129) (0.0562) (0.1710) (0.0560) (0.3365) (0.9741) (0.1043) (0.0552) (0.1189) (0.0676)
LUX -0.1019 -0.0696 -0.0567 -0.0797 0.5671 -0.8561 -0.0357 -0.0134 -0.0802 -0.0597
(0.1366) (0.1679) (0.1763) (0.0914) (0.5018) (1.1774) (0.1740) (0.2404) (0.1409) (0.2023)
NLD -0.0866 0.0068 -0.2341 -0.0858 0.0168 0.2125 -0.0738 0.0493 -0.1094 -0.0141
(0.1253) (0.0882) (0.1855) (0.0799) (0.1532) (0.8343) (0.1223) (0.0869) (0.1336) (0.0745)
NOR -0.0646 0.1142 0.1357 -0.0495 -0.1529 0.9218 -0.0908 0.1158 -0.0405 0.0981
(0.1296) (0.1005) (0.2576) (0.0832) (0.1049) (1.0244) (0.1202) (0.0975) (0.1342) (0.1320)
POR 0.0314 0.0556 -0.1255 0.0343 -0.0607 0.6167 -0.0399 0.0226 0.0670 0.1619
(0.1250) (0.0504) (0.1809) (0.0615) (0.0898) (0.8276) (0.1132) (0.0615) (0.1212) (0.0804)
SWE -0.0992 -0.0527 -0.1510 -0.0922 -0.1582 0.1586 -0.1609 -0.0412 -0.0776 0.0026
(0.1225) (0.0743) (0.1772) (0.0722) (0.1324) (0.8779) (0.1147) (0.0731) (0.1282) (0.0812)
GBR 0.0652 -0.0189 -0.1915 0.0787 0.0481 0.2603 0.0049 -0.0110 0.0796 0.0353
(0.1716) (0.0838) (0.1726) (0.1343) (0.1167) (0.5972) (0.1499) (0.0732) (0.1787) (0.0933)
16 Countries [chi Sq] 38.4624 11.2940 18.7737 46.3232 9.0580 5.0314 39.5032 11.7772 47.8395 11.3069
Akaike Info. Crit. -3.9654 -3.9702 -3.3437 -3.9758 -3.9721 -3.9643 -3.7375 -3.7391 -3.9497 -3.9225
Adj. R Sq. 0.4045 0.4073 0.3583 0.4120 0.4098 0.4052 0.3631 0.3641 0.3951 0.3784
SEE 0.0316 0.0315 0.0432 0.0314 0.0315 0.0316 0.0354 0.0354 0.0319 0.0323
26 Years [chi Sq] 102.6835 137.6130 143.2692 177.4288 203.2585 189.2812 97.2618 125.1998 104.9775 115.5420  
Numbers in parentheses are White corrected standard errors. Numbers in bold typeface indicate significance with confidence of 95% or greater. 
* These two estimations use the fitted value for G from equation (3.2):[FE-period].  
** Coefficient estimates are relative to the coefficient estimate for the USA (i.e. from equation (3.1):[FE-period + FE-alpha], α AUT=.1150=.1517-.0367).   47
Table 5 





























τ =.20    
φ =2
1 ccg = CG / (A * LY) 2.46 5.70 2.74 4.38 2.24
2 ccy = CY / (A * LG) 7.17 5.14 2.46 3.51 1.79
3 cc = C / (A * L) 0.81 5.79 5.24 2.51 3.65 1.85
4 kkg = KG / (A * LG) 61.62 44.11 22.06 32.53 17.28
5 kky = KY / (A * LY) 53.92 38.60 19.30 21.68 11.52
6 kk = K / (A * L) 6.73 56.16 39.54 19.75 23.36 12.37
7 gg = G / (A * LG) 0.36 196.24 166.04 23.48 142.58 20.78
8 yy = Y / (A * LY) 12.10 8.68 4.12 5.69 2.87
9 Y / (A * L) 1.51 8.57 7.20 3.45 4.81 2.44
10 Y/LY 4856 3484 1655 2282 1151
11 Y/L 607 3441 2890 1385 1929 981
12 L 54.48 54.48 54.48 54.48 54.48 54.48
13 K 147119 1227792 864407 431879 510707 270429
14 A 401.32 401.32 401.32 401.32 401.32 401.32
15 Growth Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 Ψ 23375 29495 14132 19691 10013
17 LG 15.87 9.29 8.90 8.42 8.06
18 LY 38.60 45.19 45.58 46.06 46.42
19 LG/L 0.291 0.171 0.163 0.155 0.148
20 KG 392517 164461 78810 109877 55874
21 KY 835275 699946 353069 400830 214555
22 KG/K 0.320 0.190 0.182 0.215 0.207
23 Total Income 25136 189341 159010 79207 106158 56117
24 Public Income 23433 29519 14144 19708 10021
25 Private Income 165908 129491 65063 86451 46096
26 C 17766 126684 114531 54818 79780 40545
27 S 7371 61390 43334 21648 25580 13544
28 Y 33074 187466 157436 75435 105107 53445
29 r 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07
30 w 720712 4.84 3.47 1.65 2.56 1.29
31 PG 1.04 0.04 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.20
32 G 7938 1250103 619049 83895 481641 67213
33 Pub Util per capita 107.14 108.04 107.25 107.76 107.04
34 Priv Util per capita 5.96 108.29 107.93 107.14 107.52 106.80
35 Pub Welfare 1701 1004 955 907 863
36 Priv welfare 4180 4877 4883 4952 4957
37 Total welfare 325 5881 5881 5838 5859 5820
 
In each of the above simulations, an initial effective capital labor ratio of 1 is imposed and the model is 
allowed to “grow” for 200 periods such that the level of labor and technology are predetermined by 
their exogenous growth rates while saving and consequently capital growth is endogenous.   48
Appendix 1 
Derivation of Allocation Rules (2.6), (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9) 
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